# An Automatic Co-stimulation Algorithm for LAN Artificial Immune Systems

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Abstract—Co-stimulations are very important in LAN AISs, but there are few automatic co-stimulation algorithms or approaches at present, and almost all of co-stimulations are implemented by network-administrators. We try to find an automatic co-stimulation algorithm to replace the administrators in LAN AISs. Detectors employed to detect abnormal packets are called NS-detectors. Detectors employed to detect normal packets are called PS-detectors. Each NS-detector can detect a different kind of potential abnormal packets. Each PS-detector can describe a different kind of normal network behaviors. The NSdetector generation algorithm and the PS-detector generation algorithm are presented first. Based on them, an automatic costimulation algorithm for LAN AISs is described in detail. Costimulations in LAN AISs can be implemented automatically with the algorithm. The administrators can still implement costimulations, but their co-stimulations are not important. The feasibility of the algorithm is illustrated with our experiments in laboratory. Our further work is to illustrate more the feasibility of the algorithm in the Internet environment.

*Keywords*—co-stimulation, algorithm, automatic, PS-detector, NS-detector

# I. INTRODUCTION

LANs are applied widely in schools, enterprises, and so on. They help people a lot in their daily learning and working, and their security is commonly concerned. In 1974 [1], network theory was tried to explain the biological immune system. From then on [2], more and more artificial immune theories have been researched, and all kinds of artificial immune systems (AISs) have been built for LAN anomaly intrusion detection.

In LAN AISs [3], when a mature detector or a memory detector detects a potential abnormal data packet, a costimulation is needed to confirm whether the packet indicates a real intrusion or not. If the co-stimulation confirms that the packet indicates a real intrusion, the mature detector evolves into a memory detector. Otherwise, the mature detector or the memory detector is discarded, and new mature detectors are generated. So, co-stimulations are very important in AISs; they confirm whether a real intrusion occurs or not and decide whether mature or memory detectors are discarded or not.

But at present [2,3,4,5], almost all of co-stimulations in LAN AISs are implemented by network-administrators. There are few automatic co-stimulation algorithms or approaches can

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be employed. The administrators play vital roles in costimulations. If the administrators are versed in intrusion detection and are conscientious, co-stimulations will be implemented correctly. Otherwise, co-stimulations may not be done correctly. Because the administrators are so important in co-stimulations and not all of them are employable, in this paper, we try to find an automatic co-stimulation algorithm to replace the administrators in LAN AISs and to improve the adaptabilities of LAN AISs.

Our algorithm is based on following assumptions. Detectors employed to detect abnormal packets are called NS-detectors, and detectors employed to detect normal packets are called PSdetectors. It is assumed that there are some common features in some abnormal network behaviors. This assumption is reasonable; it has been certified by lots of AISs; and it is the theoretical foundation that less NS-detectors can be employed to detect much more abnormal packets. Analogously, it can be assumed that there are some common features in some normal network behaviors, and less PS-detectors can be employed to detect much more normal packets. Therefore, NS-detectors can be taken as the description of potential abnormal network behaviors, and PS-detectors can be taken as the description of normal network behaviors.

Based on previous assumptions, when a NS-detector detects a potential abnormal packet, a co-stimulation can first be implemented automatically by other PS-detectors and NSdetectors; and then an administrators' co-stimulation is asked for in a given time. If the administrator doesn't implement a costimulation in the given time, the potential abnormal packet will be confirmed normal or abnormal according to the automatic co-stimulation algorithm.

In section 2, the automatic co-stimulation algorithm is described in detail. Some preliminary experimental results are given in section 3, and a few conclusions and future work are presented in section 4.

# II. THE AUTOMATIC CO-STIMULATION ALGORITHM FOR LAN AISS

In a LAN, data packets are broadcasted to every host, and each host can capture every packet in the LAN.

They are assumed that there are m intrusion detection hosts in a LAN; each host has its own self-set, NS-detector set and PS-detector set; all hosts produce their self-sets, NS-detector sets and PS-detector sets asynchronously; each host detects data packets separately; the length of every self or NS-detector or PS-detector is *l*; selves, NS-detectors, and PS-detectors are all binary strings; and the *r*-contiguous bits matching rule is employed to calculate the affinity between two binary strings [6].

A self-set is a collection of binary strings extracted from normal data packets captured by a host in a given time. Because large amount of intrusion traces such as Trojans and viruses hide in packet-bodies (not packet-heads), the binary strings are extracted from packet-bodies.

Based on the negative selection algorithm [6], a NSdetector generation algorithm is presented in this paper as in figure 1. If a randomly generated immature detector doesn't match any self in the self-set and doesn't match any NSdetector in the NS-detector set, it evolves into a mature NSdetector and is added into the NS-detector set; otherwise it is discarded. With this algorithm, in the NS-detector set, a NSdetector may not match another one. So each NS-detector describes a different kind of potential abnormal network behavior and may detect a different kind of abnormal data packets.




Figure 1. NS-detector generation algorithm

Based on the positive selection algorithm [7], a PS-detector generation algorithm is presented in this paper as in figure 2. If a randomly generated immature detector matches any self in the self-set and doesn't match any PS-detector in the PSdetector set, it evolves into a mature PS-detector and is added into the PS-detector set, and the matched selves are taken away from the self-set; otherwise it is discarded. This process is repeated until there are no selves in the self-set. With this algorithm, in the PS-detector set, one PS-detector may not match another one. Therefore each PS-detector describes a different kind of normal network behavior and can detect a different kind of normal data packets.




Figure 2. PS-detector generation algorithm

In the dynamical clonal selection algorithm [3], when a NSdetector detects a potential abnormal packet, it asks for an administrator's co-stimulation at once, and the co-stimulation is entirely implemented by the administrator. But in our automatic co-stimulation algorithm, there are 2 co-stimulations. The first is implemented automatically. Only the second is needed to implement by the administrator, and the administrator have to do the second in a given time. If the administrator doesn't do the second in the given time, the packet is confirmed abnormal or normal by the first.

See figure 3. When a NS-detector detects a potential abnormal data packet, it broadcasts the packet to all other NS-detectors and PS-detectors in the LAN, and the affinity between every NS-detector or every PS-detector and the packet is calculated with the *r*-contiguous bits matching rule [6]. Both the number of NS-detectors and the number of PS-detectors who match the packet are counted up, and they are  $N_1$  and  $N_2$  respectively.




Figure 3. Automatic co-stimulation algorithm

A simple automatic co-stimulation approach may be as follows. If  $N_1 \ge N_2$ , the packet is confirmed abnormal, otherwise it is confirmed normal. But because the probability of a NS-detector detecting a potential abnormal packet and the packet being really abnormal may be different from the probability of a PS-detector detecting a potential abnormal packet and the packet being really normal, a better automatic co-stimulation approach should embody the 2 potentially different probabilities.

They are assumed that if a NS-detector detects a potential abnormal packet, the probability of the packet being really abnormal is  $P_1$ ; if a PS-detector detects a normal packet, the probability of the packet being really normal is  $P_2$ ; if  $N_1$  NS-detectors match a packet, the probability of the packet being really abnormal is  $P_{NS}$ ; if  $N_2$  PS-detectors match a packet, the probability of the packet being really normal is  $P_{PS}$ ; the co-stimulation function is *Co-stim*. Then following 3 formulas are given.

$$P_{NS} = 1 - (1 - P_1)^{N_1} \tag{1}$$

$$P_{PS} = 1 - (1 - P_2)^{N_2} \tag{2}$$

$$Co-stim = \begin{cases} 1 & if \quad P_{NS} \ge P_{PS} \\ 0 & if \quad P_{NS} < P_{PS} \end{cases}$$
(3)

Where,  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are given values by experienced LAN AIS developers. Commonly, because there are much more normal packets than abnormal ones in a LAN,  $P_1 \leq P_2$ . In formula (3), Co-stim=1 indicates that the packet is abnormal, and Co-stim=0 indicates that the packet is normal.

If the administrator does not implement the second costimulation in a given time T, the potential abnormal packet is confirmed abnormal or normal according to formula (1) to formula (3). Otherwise, it is confirmed according to the administrator's co-stimulation. When the administrator implements the second co-stimulation, the information of the first co-stimulation such as  $N_I$ ,  $N_2$ ,  $P_{NS}$ ,  $P_{PS}$ , and the result of function *CO-stim* will help him a lot. The given time T can be several seconds or more or less; it isn't important for the algorithm performance. Although the administrator can implement a co-stimulation as in [3], his co-stimulation isn't important, too.

The approach of mature or memory NS-detectors' evolution or death is the same as that in the dynamical clonal selection algorithm [3]. A PS-detector dies only if it matches a packet confirmed abnormal by co-stimulations.

#### III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

To validate the feasibility of previous automatic costimulation algorithm, some experiments have been done in our laboratory. 5 hosts are linked to a HUB to build a LAN. A host is selected as a broadcaster to broadcast data packets to other hosts. The length of every packet-body is 64 bits, l=64, r=8,  $P_1=0.4$ , and  $P_2=0.6$ . The probability of 2 random binary strings matching at at least *r*-contiguous locations is  $P_M$ , then [3]

$$P_M \approx 2^{-r} ((l-r)/2+1) = 2^{-8} ((64-8)/2+1) = 0.11328125$$

Each host needs  $N_R$  NS-detectors to detect abnormal packets, and the probability that  $N_R$  NS-detectors fail to detect an abnormal packet is  $P_f$ . Then [3]

$$N_R = ln(P_f)/ln(1-P_M)$$

In our experiments,  $P_f = 0.1$ , then

$$N_R = ln(P_f)/ln(1-P_M) = ln(0.1)/ln(0.88671875) \approx 20$$

The probability that all of the 4 hosts fail to detect an abnormal packet is  $P_{allf}$ , then

$$P_{allf} = P_f^4 = 0.1^4 = 0.0001$$

Our experiments are as follows.

In stage 1, 5 clean DLL software modules are prepared. Their sizes are 32Kb, 36Kb, 44Kb, 29Kb, and 47Kb respectively. Each of them is disassembled into packet-bodies, and the length of every packet-body is 64 bits. The 4 self-sets are same, and each one is made up of all of the clean packetbodies. In every self-set, there are not 2 or more elements are same. The clean packet-bodies are broadcasted in the LAN to generate the 4 PS-detector sets and the 4 NS-detector sets. The size of the 4 self-sets, 4 PS-detector sets and 4 NS-detector sets are as in table I.

TABLE I. SIZE OF SETS

	Host I	Host II	HostⅢ	HostIV
Size of Self-set	22861	22861	22861	22861
Size of PS-detector Set	283	276	294	301
Size of NS-detector Set	20	20	20	20

TABLE II. DETECTION RESULTS WITH AUTOMATIC CO-STIMULATION

	Module	Module	Module	Module	Module
	I	II	III	IV	V
Alert Times	129	153	141	151	105

In stage 2, each of the previous 5 DLL software modules is infected with a different real Trojan in the Internet. Their sizes become 43 Kb, 49 Kb, 56 Kb, 42 Kb and 56 Kb respectively. Then the 5 infected modules are broadcasted one by one in the LAN. Without any administrator's intervening, the detection results with the automatic co-stimulation algorithm are as in table II . While any of the 5 infected modules is being broadcasted, the automatic co-stimulation algorithm is able to confirm abnormal packets.

Some other similar experiments are done, and their results are analogous to the above.

# IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK

We have described an automatic co-stimulation algorithm, a NS-detector generation algorithm and a PS-detectors algorithm in previous sections. The first algorithm is based on the second algorithm and the third algorithm.

We have illustrated the feasibility of the automatic costimulation algorithm with our preliminary experiments. With the automatic co-stimulation algorithm, the administrators can still implement co-stimulations as in [3], but their costimulations are not obligatory. Our further work is to generate the PS-detectors and the NS-detectors with the real Internet traffic, and to illustrate more the feasibility of the algorithm in the Internet environment.

The NS-detector generation algorithm is based on the negative selection algorithm [6]. But because a NS-detector may not match another one in the same NS-detector set, each NS-detector can detect a different kind of potential abnormal data packets.

The PS-detector generation algorithm is based on the positive selection algorithm [7]. But because a PS-detector may not match another one in the same PS-detector set, each PS-detector can describe a different kind of normal network behaviors. Our further work on this algorithm is to apply it to normal network behavior descriptions. Compared with short sequences of system calls [8], the PS-detectors are more adaptive, easier to acquire and easier to understand.

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