CrisisModeler: A Tool for Exploring Crisis Predictions

Markus Holopainen
RiskLab Finland
Arcada University of Applied Sciences
Helsinki, Finland
markus@risklab.fi

Peter Sarlin
Department of Economics
Hanken School of Economics, Helsinki, Finland
RiskLab Finland at Arcada
peter@risklab.fi

Abstract—This paper presents CrisisModeler as a tool for exploring financial crisis predictions. Despite wide interest in crisis prediction, little attention has been given to generalizable modeling solutions, real-time implementations, thorough comparisons among methods and interactive interfaces to explore models and their output. CrisisModeler combines many approaches used in predicting financial crises within a fully-fledged framework for modeling and evaluation, and provides an implementation of a general-purpose tool with a web-based interactive interface to explore model output. We present the underlying framework behind CrisisModeler and illustrate the use of it with a case study on European banks, including a horse race of methods and investigations of different specifications. The case study illustrates the versatility and suitability of the tool for supporting exploration and communication of models for crisis prediction.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides a general-purpose tool for exploring financial crisis predictions. The global financial crisis has stimulated a multitude of efforts into deriving new models and techniques for measuring systemic risk and predicting various types of adverse financial scenarios. Despite wide interest in models, little attention has been given to generalizable modeling solutions, real-time implementations, thorough comparisons among methods and interactive interfaces to explore models. The provided CrisisModeler enables interactive means for deriving and exploring predictive models within a unified framework for modeling and evaluation.

While not being a new invention, the literature on predictive models, or so-called early-warning models, has exploded in the past years. The first early-warning models relied less on advanced statistical methods and computers, as financial ratio analysis was more of a handcraft (e.g., Ramser and Foster [28]; Fitzpatrick [18]). After contributions by Beaver [7] on univariate discriminant analysis (DA), next steps moved toward multivariate analysis in Altman [3]. After the early applications by Frank and Cline [20] and Taffler and Abassi [36] of DA for predicting sovereign debt crises, a large wave of currency crisis models were introduced in the mid-1990s, including Eichengreen and Rose [16] and Frankel and Rose [19]. Likewise, the recent wave of banking and systemic financial crises has triggered a large number of efforts targeted on these specific events, such as Alessi and Detken [1], Lo Duca and Peltonen [25] and Holopainen and Sarlin [23]. Event with the existence of abundant methods ranging from conventional statistics to more recent machine learning, as well as a multitude of other general advances, little work has targeted improvements in the general framework behind modeling.

The CrisisModeler tool introduced in this paper fills the gap of a general-purpose framework for crisis prediction. It provides a fully-fledged modeling and evaluation framework targeted for early-warning models, including a large number of different modeling and evaluation approaches. CrisisModeler extends this with a visual interface that allows end-users to interactively manipulate parameters while observing how models and their output change. The broader contribution of CrisisModeler is to support awareness, transparency and accountability of modeling. Further, the framework as such enables easy integration of new modeling approaches into pre-existing evaluations and visualizations. This allows relative model comparisons given identical data and modeling and evaluation setups. CrisisModeler is in this paper illustrated with an extensive European dataset on a large number of banks. Hence, we provide real-world evidence of CrisisModeler at work, which allows us to showcase how the tool can be applied as well as results for a large number of different modeling parameters. Due to a large number of tables, we provide most of the results tables in a web appendix. In the same vein, we accompany the paper with an online browser-based implementation of the CrisisModeler application. The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the CrisisModeler tool, while Section III provides its application to European banks. Section IV concludes.

II. CRISISMODELER

The text-book example of a classification problem is simple in its essence, yet the process for reaching final model output still involves a multitude of decisions. Following the conceptual framework in Lang et al. [24], deriving an early-warning model requires a large number of decisions related to pre-modeling, modeling and post-modeling steps. In line with these three process steps, the tasks can be summarized as follows:

1 The browser-based implementation of CrisisModeler can be found at http://cm.infolytika.com/ and the web appendix at www.risklab.fi/cm.
In CrisisModeler, the underlying machinery is designed for modeling and evaluation in line with the second step of the above process. The interface to this framework allows integrating the tasks of the first and third steps into those in the second. Hence, parameters related to the modeling purpose interact with the estimations and evaluations, which then feed into policy-relevant representations of model output.

A. The decision problem in crisis prediction

Early-warning models are in need of evaluation criteria that account for the nature of the underlying problem, which relates to events with high impact, yet low probability. It is thus crucial that the evaluation framework, which sets the classifier threshold, accounts for the decision problem faced by a decisionmaker. The signal evaluation framework focuses on a decisionmaker with relative preferences between type I and II errors, and the usefulness that she derives by using a model, in relation to not using it. In the vein of the loss-function approach proposed by Alessi and Detken [1], the framework applied here follows the updated version of Sarlin [32].

For the problem at hand, we need two types of data: historical distress events and indicators of distress. To mimic an ideal leading indicator, we build a binary state variable \( C_n(h) \) \( \{0,1\} \) for observation \( n \) (where \( n = 1,2,\ldots,N \)) given a specified forecast horizon \( h \). Let \( C_n(h) \) be a binary indicator that is one during pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise. For detecting events \( C_n \), using information from indicators, we need to estimate the probability of being in a vulnerable state \( p_n \) \( \{0,1\} \). Herein, we make use of a number of different methods \( m \) for estimating \( p_n^{m} \) ranging from the standard logistic regression approach to more sophisticated techniques from machine learning. The probability \( p_n \) is turned into a binary prediction \( B_n \), which takes the value one if \( p_n \) exceeds a specified threshold \( \tau \) \( [0,1] \) and zero otherwise. The correspondence between the prediction \( B_n \) and the ideal leading indicator \( C_n \) can then be summarized into a so-called contingency matrix.

The frequencies of prediction-realization combinations in the contingency matrix can be used for computing measures of classification performance. A decisionmaker can be thought of to be primarily concerned with two types of errors: issuing a false alarm and missing a crisis. The evaluation framework described below is based upon that in Sarlin [32] for turning decisionmaker’s preferences into a loss function, where the decisionmaker has relative preferences between type I and II errors. While type I errors represent the share of missed crises to the frequency of crises \( T_J \) \( [0,1] = \text{FN}/(\text{TP+FN}) \), type II errors represent the share of issued false alarms to the frequency of tranquil periods \( T_J \) \( [0,1] = FP/(FP+TN) \). Given probabilities \( p_n \) of a model, the decisionmaker then finds an optimal threshold \( \tau \) such that her loss is minimized. The loss of a decisionmaker includes \( T_J \) and \( T_J^* \), weighted by relative preferences between missing crises (\( \mu \)) and issuing false alarms (\( 1-\mu \)). By accounting for unconditional probabilities of crises \( P_1 = \Pr(C=1) \) and tranquil periods \( P_2 = \Pr(C=0) = 1-P_1 \), as classes are not of equal size and errors are scaled with class size, the loss function can be written as follows:

\[
L(\mu) = \mu T_J P_1 + (1-\mu) T_J^* P_2, \tag{1}
\]

which computes the superiority of a model in relation to not using any model. As the unconditional probabilities are commonly unbalanced and the decisionmaker may be more concerned about the rare class, a decisionmaker could achieve a loss of \( \min(\mu P_1, (1-\mu) P_2) \) by either always or never signalling a crisis. This predicament highlights the challenge in building a useful early-warning model: With an imperfect model, it would otherwise easily pay off for the decisionmaker to always signal the high-frequency class. Second, we can compute the relative Usefulness \( U_r \) as follows:

\[
U_r(\mu) = \frac{\min(\mu P_1, (1-\mu) P_2)}{L(\mu)}, \tag{2}
\]

where \( U_r \) of the model is compared with the maximum possible Usefulness of the model. That is, the loss of disregarding the model is the maximum available Usefulness. Hence, \( U_r \) reports \( U_s \) as a share of the Usefulness that a decisionmaker would gain with a perfectly-performing model, which supports interpretation of the measure. It is worth noting that \( U_s \) better lends to comparisons over different \( \mu \).

Beyond the above measures, the contingency matrix may be used for computing a wide range of other quantitative measures.\(^2\) Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves and the area under the ROC curve (AUC) are also used for comparing performance of early-warning models. The ROC curve plots, for the complete range of \( \tau \) \( [0,1] \), the conditional probability of positives to the conditional probability of negatives:

\[
ROC = \Pr(P = 1 \mid C = 1)/\left(1 - \Pr(P = 0 \mid C = 0)\right). \tag{4}
\]

\(^2\) Some of the commonly used evaluation measures include: Recall positives (or TP rate) = \( \text{TP}/(\text{TP+FN}) \), Recall negatives (or TN rate) = \( \text{TN}/(\text{TN+FP}) \), Precision positives = \( \text{TP}/(\text{TP+FP}) \), Precision negatives = \( \text{TN}/(\text{TN+FN}) \), Accuracy = \( \text{TP}/(\text{TP+FN}) \) and \( \text{FP}/(\text{FP+TN}) \), FN rate = \( \text{FN}/(\text{FN+TP}) \).
B. Modeling techniques

This section presents a sample of classifiers that have been implemented into CrisisModeler. Generally, classification is considered an instance of supervised learning, out of which we make use of a number of probabilistic classifiers, whose outputs are probabilities indicating membership to two qualitative classes (pre-crisis or tranquil periods). Machine learning has provided a broad palette of approaches for the task of classification. Thus, it is worth noting that the individual methods described herein provide only a sample of approaches to derive classifiers for the task at hand. In addition to the benchmark method of logistic regression, we cover five machine learning approaches.

1) Logit analysis (LA): Through a log-linearized regression, LA describes the probability of an observation belonging to one of two classes based on one or more predictors. For the case with one predictor, the logistic function is \( p(X) = \frac{e^{\beta_0+\beta_1X}}{1+e^{\beta_0+\beta_1X}} \), which is obvious to extend to the multivariate cases. Logit and probit models have frequently been applied to predicting financial crises, including Eichengreen and Rose [16], Frankel and Rose [19], Sachs et al. [29], Barrell et al. [6] and Lo Duca and Peltonen [25].

2) k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN): KNN is a nonparametric classifier (see, e.g. Altman [4]) that assigns observations to the class most common among its k nearest neighbors. CrisisModeler makes use of the Minkowski distance to determine the nearest neighbors, as well as a kernel function (see e.g. Hechenbichler and Schliep [22]) which returns similarity measures of the neighbors based on proximity. The framework uses the 'optimal' weighting kernel proposed by Samworth [30], and considers two free parameters, the integer k and a parameter p which determines the order of the Minkowski distance. The KNN method was shown to perform well in the horse race by Holopainen and Sarlin [23].

3) Classification tree (CT): A CT (e.g., Breiman et al. [10]) implements a tree-type structure to classify by performing a sequence of tests on the values of the predictors. Conjunction rules segment the predictor space into a number of regions, allowing for decision boundaries of complex shapes. Pruning is oftentimes used to reduce size and improve generalization ability, which the CrisisModeler adjusts with a free parameter steering complexity. In the early-warning literature, the use of the CT has been fairly common, including Schimmelpfennig et al. [35], Chamon et al. [11] and Duttagupta and Cashin [15].

4) Random forest (RF): The RF (Breiman [10]) uses the CT as a building block to construct a more sophisticated ensemble-like method. The RF grows a pre-defined number of CTs with randomly sampled subsets of the data and subgroups of predictors. The randomness in predictors increases diversity in model output, which has been shown to reduce variance in the average. CrisisModeler considers two free parameters: the number of trees, and the size of the randomly sampled predictor subgroup. As to our knowledge, the RF has only been applied to early-warning exercises in Alessi and Detken [2] and Holopainen and Sarlin [23].

5) Artificial Neural Networks (ANN): ANNs are characterized by a system of nodes or units connected by links (e.g., Venables and Ripley [38]). Weights associated with the links are iteratively tuned network parameters. CrisisModeler implements a basic single hidden layer feed-forward neural network with two free parameters: the number of units in the hidden layer and the weight decay. The first parameter controls the complexity of the network, while the second is used to control how the learning algorithm converges. ANNs have been applied to crisis prediction since the 1990s, including Nag and Mitra [26], Peltonen [27], Fioramanti [17] and Sarlin and Marghescu [33]. Further, Sarlin [31] used an ANN optimized with a genetic algorithm for predicting systemic financial crises.

6) Support Vector Machines (SVM): The SVM (Cortes and Vapnik [14]) can be devised as a nonparametric classifier by using hyperplanes in a high-dimensional space to construct a decision boundary. CrisisModeler considers the following free parameters: cost, which affects the tolerance for misclassified observations when constructing the separator; and gamma, defining the area of influence for a support vector. In the horse race of Holopainen and Sarlin [23], SVMs were shown to be among the best-in-class approaches for predicting systemic banking crises.

7) Ensemble learning (EL): As is common in machine learning, CrisisModeler implements four approaches for concurrent use of multiple models. These four ensemble learning approaches are mainly based on so-called bagging and boosting. Boosting [34] refers to computing output with several models and averaging results, whereas bagging [9] uses resampling from the original data and aggregates into one model output. We follow the ensemble approaches proposed in Holopainen and Sarlin [23], which were applied to banking crisis prediction. Even though not being an aggregation of models, EL I nevertheless uses multiple models in that it chooses the single best method for each estimation, as determined by largest in-sample Usefulness. EL II is based on the principle of voting, and simply utilizes the signals of all methods via a majority vote. The two final approaches aggregate instead probabilities of methods to a mean (arithmetic or weighted), after which these aggregated probabilities are treated as if they were outputs of a single method. EL III is simply an observation-wise arithmetic mean of the probabilistic outputs of all individual methods. Finally, EL IV is calculated as a weighted mean of the probabilistic outputs of all individual methods. For each observation j, the weight of method i out of n models is calculated as

\[
    w_{ij} = U_{ij} / \sum_{i=1}^{n} U_{ij},
\]

where \( U_{ij} \) is the in-sample Usefulness for observation i of method j. In the event of one or more methods having negative Usefulness, the following changes are made to the weights. If one or more methods have negative Usefulness, their weights are set to zero, removing them from the ensemble. If the Usefulness-values of all methods are negative, only the best method is used (as equal to Ensemble I). If the Usefulness-values of all methods are missing, all methods are given identical weights (as equal to Ensemble III).
C. Modeling strategies

With the objective of deriving models for out-of-sample prediction, we outline herein the strategies used in the framework. We tackle the problem in two separate parts: the model selection procedure and the evaluation exercise.

As five of the methods presented in Section II.B include free parameters which in different ways control the complexity of each of these methods, they need to be optimized based on the data at hand. For this task the framework includes a so-called grid search. A set of values to be tested are selected based on common rules of thumb for each parameter (i.e., usually minimum and maximum values and regular steps in between), after which a grid search is performed on the discrete parameter space of the Cartesian product of the parameter sets. To avoid overfitting as the result of parameters of too high complexity, the framework employs 10-fold cross-validation and ranks the parameter choices of each method based on out-of-sample Usefulness. After this the single parameter (or the parameter combinations, for methods with several free parameters) yielding the highest out-of-sample Usefulness are chosen and used to calibrate the model.

As pooled models with panel data are common in the literature, data generally include a cross-sectional and time dimension. Thus, we ought to consider that data is likely to exhibit temporal dependencies. Although the cross-validation literature has put forward advanced techniques to decrease the impact of dependence (see e.g. Arlot and Celisse [5]), the most prominent approach is to limit estimation samples to historical data for each prediction. In order to test models from the viewpoint of real-time analysis, CrisisModeler implements the recursive exercise as in Holopainen and Sarlin [23], which derives a new model at each quarter using only data available up to that point in time. The exercise enables testing whether the use of classification models would have provided means for predicting future events, and how different techniques rank in terms of performance for the task. The recursive algorithm proceeds as follows. For each quarter \( q \) (or other chosen frequency), we estimate a model based on all available information up to that point \( t = 0, 1, \ldots, q - 1 \) and predict the out-of-sample values for \( t = q \). The in-sample probabilities for \( t = 0, 1, \ldots, q - 1 \) are used to find an optimal threshold \( t^* \), which is used for \( t = q \) to generate out-of-sample signals. Thus both the optimal threshold and the models themselves are time-varying. At the end, CrisisModeler collects all predictions and evaluates how well the model has performed in out-of-sample analysis. The same exercise is then performed for all separate methods as well as for the ensembles, as outlined in Section II.B.

Following the reasoning in Bussière and Fratzscher [12], the framework accounts for post-crisis and crisis bias by not including the period when an actual crisis occurs or one year thereafter. These periods of time are not considered useful data for training, as they represent neither a vulnerable pre-crisis period nor a period of tranquility. These observations are thus dropped from all in-sample data used, whereas testing data for each recursion is kept intact. For comparability reasons, the out-of-sample probabilities are transformed in the framework to reflect the distribution of the in-sample data, utilizing the empirical cumulative distribution function. Using this function, both the in-sample and the out-of-sample probabilities are converted to percentiles of the in-sample probabilities for each recursion.

D. Interaction with CrisisModeler

The CrisisModeler tool is implemented in R with a web-browser interface, allowing for easy interaction with the methods, settings and preferences, as shown in Fig. 1. The motivation for this solution is that a web-server implementation requires no further installation of software or in-depth technical knowledge on the user end. All calculations are carried out by the server, which also diminishes computational burden on the end-user’s machine.

The main view of the application consists of a left-side panel with settings and parameters, and a main page for the output of the exercise. As changes in exercise or method parameters are made in the left-hand panel, the main page calculates a new output based on the chosen parameters. The user is given the possibility to load their own data with specific indicators and distress events. Based on the data, CrisisModeler constructs an ideal leading indicator (with the chosen forecast horizon), trains the selected probabilistic classifiers, computes their optimal thresholds and returns binary classifications. The models account for the preference between type I and II errors, as specified by the user.

The left panel includes manual input of data, a number of parameters relating to the exercise output (such as the pre-crisis and post-crisis horizon intervals, and the preference between type I and II errors), as well as checkboxes enabling the choice of single methods along with their corresponding parameters. The main page output is, by default, the performance results of the recursive exercise with the chosen exercise parameters and methods in a table format. The performance measures include Usefulness, the area under the ROC curve (denoted AUC), as well as a large number of other common measures. This table, as well as the out-of-sample data, including output probabilities, thresholds and predictions, is downloadable in csv format for reference and further analysis. Additional views include various other model details, including visualizations of model output of individual methods, summaries of modeling parameters for chosen methods, and model descriptions for more details of each method.

III. CRISISMODELER AT WORK

This section presents an application of CrisisModeler to predict bank distress in Europe. In the following, we describe the used data and prediction results for a number of model specifications.

A. Crises and indicators

In order to derive early-warning models for European banks, we use a data set based on a large number of different sources of publicly available data (following Betz et al. [8] and Lang et al. [24]). The data is collected, for an observation period from 2000Q1 to 2014Q3, on 546 banks with a minimum of EUR 1bn in total assets, resulting in a total of 29547 quarterly observations. Thus, the data set covers large
banks relevant to systemic risk due to interlinkages and interconnectedness. We utilize information which would have been accessible at each specific point in time. Data reported annually are used in the data set for the subsequent four quarters, and publication lags are accounted for.

As European direct bank failures have been rare, the scarcity of event data would not allow focus on only bankruptcies and other failures alike. To tackle this, the data set used herein also accounts for state aid and forced mergers, in addition to bankruptcies, liquidations and defaults.

Direct bank failures are captured as follows. A bankruptcy is defined to occur if the net worth of a bank falls below the guidelines of the country in question, and a liquidation is defined to occur if a bank is sold according to the guidelines of the liquidator, in which case shareholders may not be compensated in full. Defaults are defined as either when a bank has failed to pay interest or principal on at least one financial obligation outside any grace period specified in the terms, or when a bank finalizes a distressed exchange, in which at least one financial obligation is repurchased or replaced by other instruments with a diminished total value. The data source for the bankruptcies and liquidations is Bankscope, whilst annual default data is retrieved from Moody’s and Fitch. A distress event is defined to start when distress is announced, and ends when the actual event occurs. Next, we include data on state intervention to identify banks in distress. A bank is defined to be in distress if it receives a capital injection by the state or participates in an asset relief program. The events are based on data from the European Commission with accompaniments market sources (Bloomberg and Reuters). As above, the events are defined to start from the time of announcement to the execution of the state support program. Finally, merged entities are defined to be in distress if either a parent receives state support within 12 months after the merger, or if a merged entity has a coverage ratio below zero within 12 months before the merger. The reasoning behind only including this rule for mergers is that a single bank may still survive with a negative coverage ratio, whereas merged entities may have been forced to do so due to distress. The coverage ratio is calculated as the ratio of capital equity and loan reserves minus nonperforming loans to total assets. Merger data is obtained from Bankscope, and data for the coverage ratio is retrieved from Bloomberg. The events obtained are cross-checked using market sources (Reuters and Bloomberg) to avoid possible mismatches. The events are defined as to start when a merger occurs and to end when the parent receives state support, and to start when the coverage ratio falls below zero and to end when the merger occurs.

CrisisModeler allows for arbitrary selection of the forecast horizon. For this case study, we use a forecast horizon of 8 quarters, meaning that the binary pre-distress variable is defined as the value 1 in 1-8 quarters prior to the actual distress event as defined above, and 0 otherwise.

The explanatory variables used are chosen from three separate classes following a micro-macro perspective with the aim to capture underlying vulnerabilities. In addition to bank-specific balance-sheet and income-statement indicators, we complement the data with country-specific indicators for the banking sector, as well as with country-specific measures of macroeconomic and financial imbalances. The bank-specific indicators chosen account for all dimensions in the CAMELS rating system and are constructed using Bloomberg data. The banking-sector-specific indicators proxy for imbalances at the banking system level and are calculated using statistics from the Balance Sheet Items of the Monetary, Financial Institutions and Markets as obtained from the ECB. The third
and final category of variables consists of selected internal and external indicators of the EU Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) which identify country-specific macroeconomic imbalances. They are obtained from Eurostat and Bloomberg, complemented with house price indicators from the ECB.

From the large number of indicators covering the above-mentioned classes, we follow [24] in identifying the (twelve) most relevant with the LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator, see Tibshirani [37]) procedure. These are presented ordered by class in Table I. This choice of variables leads to a data set with 9776 quarterly observations with no missing values, containing 292 distress observations and 1052 pre-distress observations.

Table I. Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank</td>
<td>Tangible capital to assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest expenses to liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserves to assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Financial assets to GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mortgages to loans, 1-year change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Securities to liabilities, 1-year change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>Total credit to GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total credit to GDP, 3-year change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House price deviation from trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International investment position to GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector debt to GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-year bond yield, 1-year change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II. Model selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trees</td>
<td>Complexity parameter = 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNN</td>
<td>$k = 17$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random forest</td>
<td>Distance = 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN</td>
<td>No. of trees = 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of predictors sampled = 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>Gamma = 0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost = 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. A horse race of modeling techniques

As above discussed, we perform model selection with a grid search using the framework. This provides a set of optimal model parameters given the selected horizons and preferences. These optimal parameters are summarized in Table II. Following the reasoning that a positive signal is only a call for internal investigation and that the negative repercussions of false alarms are low, we assume the benchmark preference $\mu$ to be 0.9. The recursive exercise, as outlined in Section II.B, is performed for all quarters from 2007Q1 to 2013Q1.

Table III shows the results of the recursive horse race with all six methods. It may firstly be noted that the more complex machine learning methods outperform methods designed for interpretability, namely classification trees and the conventional logit method, when ranked by descending Usefulness. The AUC for the top two methods, KNN and Random forest, is significantly higher than the rest, suggesting robust performance.

C. Aggregating model output

In addition to using a single technique or many techniques alongside each other, the logical next step is to aggregate the methods into one output. As outlined in Section II.B, we derive four ensembles, which consist of two averages (arithmetic mean and weighted mean) of all probabilities, as well as an in-sample best-of-method and finally an ensemble based on a majority vote. In CrisisModeler, the ensembles may be constructed based on any combination of the methods supported by the framework. In this case study, we use ensembles based on all six methods. The results of the ensemble horse race are shown in Table IV. In general, the ensembles perform well across the board. The voting ensemble has a higher bias towards false positives due to its construction as it signals distress based on positive signals from at least three methods. However its’ Usefulness is still the highest out of all ensembles. The best-of ensemble is identical to the Random forest method, which has experienced the best in-sample performance over all recursive quarters. For all probability-based ensembles, the AUC is also high (AUC cannot be calculated for the voting ensemble as it is not probabilistic).

D. Varying model specifications

CrisisModeler lends itself well to swift comparisons over different preferences or specifications, by varying one specification component from the benchmark and studying its effects on model output. Next, we study the robustness of our results by looking at two more interesting aspects of model specification; country-specific versus pooled models, and models trained using data of large banks versus small banks. As in the benchmark results of Tables III and IV, the decisionmaker’s preference $\mu$ is 0.9.3

1) Country-specific vs. pooled models: The notion of preferring pooled models (see e.g. Fuertes and Kalotychou [21]) originates from the desire to model a wide variety of crises, as well as the common shortage of distress events in individual countries. We compare the effects of the pooled models with their country-specific equivalents by first separating the signals of the recursive horse race by individual countries, and then recalculating their out-of-sample performance. For comparison, we then set up new country-specific recursive horse races using only data from one country at a time. These are evaluated out-of-sample, and compared country-wise to the models which have been trained using the entire pooled data set.

3 We accompany the paper with a web appendix, in which we provide all tables for the results with varying model specifications. The web appendix can be found here: www.risklab.fi/cm.
The data set comprises banks from 27 European countries, however, only nine countries are usable for performing the country-specific recursive horse races due to lack of data. Of these nine countries, we present the horse races of German and French banks in Tables A.I and A.II, and Tables A.III and A.IV, respectively. These countries each represent an adequately large sample, with 764 and 796 observations. For both countries, the un-pooled models outperform the pooled models. However, performance of the pooled models is generally good and country-specific models can only be computed for a few countries.

2) Large vs. small banks: Using the same notion as above, we want to investigate the effects of models trained using data only from large or from small banks, compared to models trained using pooled data. The banks are split according to the median of a variable related to their size, resulting in two samples, with 155 small banks and 163 large banks. The out-of-sample signals of the benchmark pooled models are separated into categories “large banks” and “small banks” and their performance is re-evaluated. These results are then compared to models trained using only data of large banks and data of small banks, respectively.

The results of the horse races for small banks are shown in Tables A.V and A.VI in the Appendix, where the former is based on the benchmark pooled models, and the latter is the corresponding where data of small banks has been used for training of the models. The differences in Usefulness overall are minor between the two approaches, notably the SVM does not perform well in the models trained with small bank data (Table A.VI) and consequently affects the performance of the arithmetic mean ensemble. In general, the ensembles perform well.

The corresponding results for large banks are shown in Tables A.VII and A.VIII in the Appendix, where the former is based on the pooled models and the latter trained using data from large banks only. The SVM does not perform well, probably due to an overfit, but when comparing the two tables over all other techniques there are only minor differences. It may be noted that the Usefulness values are slightly lower than both the benchmark results and the results for the small banks, suggesting that distress prediction of larger banks is more challenging for this sample.

### Table III. Recursive Horse Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>TP</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>TN</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
<th>TP rate</th>
<th>FN rate</th>
<th>U(μ)</th>
<th>U(μ)</th>
<th>AUC</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNN</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>4892</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>0.858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>472</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>5509</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1127</td>
<td>4873</td>
<td>286</td>
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<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>0.788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1639</td>
<td>4361</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logit</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1518</td>
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<td>267</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0.788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trees</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>5044</td>
<td>386</td>
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<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.636</td>
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</table>

### Table IV. Recursive Horse Race, Ensembles

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>TP</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>TN</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
<th>TP rate</th>
<th>FN rate</th>
<th>U(μ)</th>
<th>U(μ)</th>
<th>AUC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>4937</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5509</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted</td>
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<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>0.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-weighted</td>
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<td>5118</td>
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<td>0.66</td>
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<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>0.851</td>
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</table>

IV. Conclusion

Despite a multitude of recent approaches for modeling financial crises, little attention has been given to generalizable modeling solutions, real-time implementations, thorough comparisons among methods and interactive interfaces to explore model output. This paper presented the CrisisModeler tool along with its underlying machinery – a fully-fledged modeling and evaluation framework targeted for early-warning models – which is accessed through a web-based interface. Through this visual interface, CrisisModeler provides access to a large number of different modeling approaches and allows end-users to interactively manipulate parameters while observing how models and their output change. The paper stressed the underlying motivation of CrisisModeler – the streamlining of the numerous tasks and decisions related to the estimation and evaluation steps of the modeling process. Further, as the framework enables easy integration of new modeling approaches into pre-existing evaluations and visualizations, the tool lends itself particularly well to relative model comparisons given identical data, modeling and evaluations setups, thus supporting awareness, transparency and accountability.

As a case study, we have applied CrisisModeler to a European bank-level data set with the goal of predicting bank distress. The used data set features low probability, high impact distress events, thus underlining the relevance of accounting for decisionmaker preferences when optimizing classifier thresholds. In addition to the horse race – allowing for direct comparison between different methods – the tool was used to investigate a few different setups, such as country-specific versus pooled models and the use of only small versus large banks for model training. The data set, spanning a relatively short period of time due to data availability, causes an ambiguous scenario where general performance is not optimal. This highlights the importance of interactive means for exploring model performance over different modeling specifications. Some methods were shown to perform slightly better than others, but notably the ensembles were consistently among best-in-class methods. For a selected sample of countries, we have shown that country-specific models outperform pooled models in a bank-level setting, yet this is far from a generalizable feature. As an
application of the CrisisModeler tool, this case study illustrated the versatility and suitability of the tool for supporting exploration and communication of models for crisis predictions.

REFERENCES