

REAL-TIME SYSTEMS SAFETY CONTROL CONSIDERING HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACE

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Abstract: In this paper it is presented the analysis of real-time industrial controllers when it is taken into account human behavior in the use of fully automated industrial systems. It is intended to develop safe controllers for these systems and make them robust against inappropriate utilizations by human operators. For the attainment of our goals it is used a case study, where, based on a IEC 60848 specification, is deduced the controller program. Further, it is elaborated the controller model, the Plant model and the Human Machine Interface Model of the automated system. The obtained results are generalized for other similar systems with the presented case study.

1 INTRODUCTION

Since the early eighties, the influence of the human role and of the degree of the human implication in the human-machine global performance (production, safety,...) has been studied. Tom Sheridan defined (Sheridan, 1984) the well-known degrees of automation and their consequences. These defined three degrees of automation and their consequences are:

- In fully manual controlled systems, safety totally depends on the human controller reliability;
- An intermediate, state allows a task sharing between the human operators and the automated controlled systems; and,
- Fully automated systems reject the human operator out of the control and that can produce a lack of vigilance, a loss of skill and can prevent him to assume all the responsibility on the system. Therefore, the system safety is almost totally linked to the technical reliability.

In the study presented on this paper we will focus on the third point related with the fully automated systems. In the industrial controllers analysis, it will be used simulation and formal verification techniques to increase, together, the safety of industrial controllers.

Among the several available techniques for the industrial controllers analysis, Simulation (Baresi *et al.* 2000, Baresi *et al.* 2002) and Formal Verification (Moon 1994, Roussel and Denis 2002), can be distinguished due to their utility. In the research works on industrial controllers' analysis, these two techniques are rarely used simultaneously. In our work, here presented, these two techniques are used together and it is shown that exist some limitations in the use of Simulation when compared with Formal Verification. These limitations are demonstrated in a context of studying the Human Machine Interface (HMI) of real time industrial systems. Some results that seem to be correct, using Simulation, may not be correct when using Formal Verification. This paper is focused in giving an overview in the limitations of Simulation when compared with Formal Verification in a context of the HMI.

To accomplish our goals, in this work, the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, it is presented the challenge proposed to achieve in this work. Section 2 presents a general presentation of the case study involving a system with two tanks filled and emptied by the control of some on-off valves. Further, it is presented the methodology to obtain the controller program deduced from an IEC 60848 SFC specification of the system's desired behaviour. Sections 3 and 4 are, respectively, devoted to the modelling the plant and HMI. In section 5 are presented the system behaviour analysis results and

finally, in section 6 are presented some conclusions and future work.

2 CASE STUDY

The case study, composed by two tanks and filling and emptying on-off valves, is presented in figure 1. Tank1 is filled by opening valve V1. When the level of the tank1 becomes high, the valve V1 is closed. After a waiting time of ten time units, valve V2 is opened and the fluid flows from tank1 into tank2.

When tank1 is empty, valve2 is closed and, after a waiting time of fifteen time units, valve3 is opened and the fluid flows out of tank2. Finally when tank3 is empty, valve V3 is closed. In this work we consider that one time unit is equal to one second.




Figure 1: Evaporator system: Closed-loop system composed by controller and plant and start, stop and shut buttons to interact with human behaviour.

Three buttons can influence the above normal operation: *start*, *stop* and *shut*. In order to guarantee the desired functioning of the system it is necessary to simulate the following desired behaviors, traduced by three system behavior properties:

- **Property 1 (P1):** In the beginning, when the *start* button is pressed the system must start, immediately, filling the tank 1.
- **Property 2 (P2):** Button “shut” is used to shutdown the process. When the *shut* button is

pressed the system controller must reach the initial state or the system must begin emptying immediately the two tanks, in simultaneous.

- **Property 3 (P3):** When the *stop* button is pressed the system must stand in its actual situation.

2.1 IEC 60848 Controller Specification




Figure 2: SFC specification of the controller.

As we use the Simulation and Formal Verification, using different tools and intending to conciliate the obtained results, we adopted a controller specification that is the same for the basis of the controller program in the two analysis techniques.

Thus, the controller specification was developed in IEC 60848 SFC because it can be used as the basis for the development of the Programmable

Logic Controller program (PLC), to be verified with UPPAAL based on timed automata (Alur and Dill, 1990), and also it is the basis for the controller program to be used by StateGraphs Modelica library (Otter *et al.* 2005).

Table 1: Input/Output variables of the controller.

Inputs	Outputs
Start – system start	V1 – open valve1
stop – system stop	V2 – open valve2
shut – system shutdown	V3 – open valve3
T1E – tank1 empty	
T1F – tank1 full	
T2E – tank1 empty	
T2F – tank1 full	

The input and output variables of the controller model are summarized on Table 1; minimum and maximum level sensors of the tanks and the human-machine interface buttons (*start*, *stop* and *shut*) are controller program inputs and the on-off valves (V1, V2 and V3) are controller program outputs.

In order to guarantee the desired behaviour for the described system, a IEC 60848 SFC specification is presented in Figure 2. As IEC 60848 SFC is a specification language (and not a programming one), it is necessary to translate the SFC specification, first to a StateGraph program, presented in (Seabra and Machado, 2007) and, second, to translate it into a program written in a PLC programming language (in this case it will be used the ladder language). This translation is done using a methodology, having as base the specification algebraic representation and considering also the controller program behavior presented at (Machado, 2006).

3 MODEL OF THE PLANT

In the plant modeling, first, the plant is modeled with the Modelica programming language (Elmqvist and Mattson, 1997) and simulated with the Dymola software and, second, it is modeled by timed automata to be used as input of the UPPAAL software (David *et al.* 2003). The delays obtained, in the simulation with the Dymola software, are used to create the timed automata that are used on Formal Verification with the UPPAAL tool.

3.1 Plant Modelling for Simulation Purposes

All the system was modeled. The tank1 model is presented on this sub-chapter. Lets consider the case of the tank 1 we have, for the Modelica programming language the model presented in Figure 3.

```

model Tank1
  Modelica.Blocks.Interfaces.RealOutput levelSensor;
  Modelica.StateGraph.Examples.Utilities.inflow inflow1;
  Modelica.StateGraph.Examples.Utilities.outflow outflow1;
  Real level "Tank level in % of max height";
  parameter Real A=1 "ground area of tank in m²";
  parameter Real a=0.2 "area of drain hole in m²";
  parameter Real hmax=1 "max height of tank in m";
  constant Real g=Modelica.Constants.g_n;
  Modelica.StateGraph.Examples.Utilities.inflow inflow2;
equation
  der(level) = (inflow1.Fi + inflow2.Fi - outflow1.Fo)/(hmax*A);
  if outflow1.open then
    outflow1.Fo = sqrt(2*g*hmax*level)*a;
  else
    outflow1.Fo = 0;
  end if;
  levelSensor = level;
end Tank1;

connector Modelica.Blocks.Interfaces.RealOutput =
  output RealSignal "output Real' as connector";

connector Modelica.Blocks.Interfaces.RealSignal
  "Real port (both input/output possible)"
  replaceable type SignalType = Real;
  extends SignalType;
end RealSignal;

connector Modelica.StateGraph.Examples.Utilities.inflow
  import Units = Modelica.SIunits;
  Units.VolumeFlowRate Fi "inflow";
end inflow;

connector Modelica.StateGraph.Examples.Utilities.outflow
  import Units = Modelica.SIunits;
  Units.VolumeFlowRate Fo "outflow";
  Boolean open "valve open";
end outflow;

```

Figure 3: Modelica code for tank1 model.

The other physical parts of the system were modeled (Seabra and Machado, 2007) but not presented in this paper because is not part of the goals of this paper.

3.2 Plant Modelling for Formal Verification Purposes

For modeling the plant with formal verification purposes there are considered the following modules for the plant modeling: Tank1 and Tank2.

Model of tank1:

The obtained delays on simulation were used on formal verification with UPPAAL. The corresponding model of the tank developed in UPPAAL for formal verification purposes is presented in Figure 4.




Figure 4: UPPAAL model of tank1.

We consider four states: *empty* models that tank1 is empty; *filling* models that the liquid is entering in tank1; *full* models that tank1 is full; state *overflow* is also considered, this is a possible state for the tank, but describes an undesired behaviour. In this model, it is also considered that the tank1 is emptied in a very short time, when compared with the filling time. We have considered this time null. It is for that reason that the model goes from the *full* state directly to the *empty* state, without an intermediate state. The Boolean variables T1E and T1F are associated with *tank1.empty* and *tank1.full*, respectively. These variables represent the level sensors' signals sent by the sensors from the plant to the controller. The maximum time for filling tank1 is six time units.

Model of tank2:

The model of tank2 is presented in figure 5 and the reasoning followed to obtain this model was the same as presented before for obtaining the tank1 model. As emptying tank1 is considered to take a short (null) time, the filling of the tank2 is done in the same conditions, since the liquid is transferred from tank1 to tank2.




Figure 5: UPPAAL model of tank2.

Four states are considered: *empty*, *full*, *emptying* and *overflow* which is a possible state for the tank, but describes an undesired behavior. The variables T2E and T2F have the same behavior on the tank2

model as the T1E and T1F described above on the tank1 model. Empty tank2 takes, at maximum, twenty-six time units.

4 MODELLING THE HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACE

In this chapter are modelled the three buttons: *start*, *stop* and *shut*. The models for these elements of the (HMI) are presented in figures 6, 7 and 8.

For each HMI button the considered behaviours are that each one can be in the state *off* or *on*. They can change of state at any time, according the human behaviour.




Figure 6: Model of the start button.




Figure 7: Model of the stop button.




Figure 8: Model of the shut button.

In the evolutions of the controller model it is considered that it will be implemented into a PLC with a scan cycle composed by three distinct phases: *Controller Inputs Reading* (CIR), *Controller Computing* (CCO) and *Controller Outputs Updating* (COU).

The evolution of the controller model takes into account the state changing of the HMI buttons at each moment that it is in the CIR state. Any changing of the HMI buttons state during the evolution of the controller behaviour is not detected by the controller model (as it is in the real behaviour of the controller). Taking into account the characteristics of the controller behaviour, the characteristics of the plant behaviour and the characteristics of the HMI behaviour, the properties must be proved in the end of the evolution of the controller model, after the *Controller Outputs Updating* states.

5 SYSTEM BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS RESULTS

In the analysis of the system behaviour there were used the two indicated techniques: the Simulation and the Formal Verification.

It is pointed out that the system behaviors that we intend to analyze, in this paper, are directly related with possible human behaviors (correct or incorrect) in the use of the automated system. There are allowed, in the HMI models all possible human behaviors with the three considered buttons.

The work presented here is a small part of a larger developed work in the proof of properties in real-time systems. The developed work in the context of the controller behavior properties and the global system behavior properties were presented, respectively, in (Machado et al. 2007-a) and (Machado et al. 2007-b).

The properties to prove, related with HMI, are:

- **Property 1 (P1):** In the beginning, when the start button is pressed the system must start, immediately, filling the tank 1.
- **Property 2 (P2):** Button “shut” is used to shutdown the process. When the shut button is pressed the system controller must reach the initial state or the system must begin emptying immediately the two tanks, in simultaneous.
- **Property 3 (P3):** When the stop button is pressed the system must stand in its actual situation.

5.1 Simulation Results

Considering Simulation all properties are true.

As in this paper it is intended to show the advantages of Formal Verification related with Simulation, we will focus on Formal Verification results discussion.

5.2 Formal Verification Results

Before presenting the formal verification results the properties must be formalized using the UPPAAL syntax, and, for that, we need a small part of TCTL formalism (Alur *et al.* 1993). In the formulas below which are all (possibly timed) invariants, A is the universal quantifier on paths: for *any path...*, and $[]$ means *always...* The combination $A []$ means *for all states in the future...*

There are considered, for the properties formalization, the input and output variables of the controller, the step variables of the controller SFC program and the state of the controller model, where are verified the properties according some rules defined in (Machado, 2006). The considered state of the controller model for the properties verification is the *Controller Outputs Updating* state, COU.

For the properties formalization we have:

- **P1:** $A [] !(COU \ \&\& \ X1 \ \&\& \ start)$
- **P2:** $A [] !((COU \ \&\& \ !X22 \ \&\& \ shut) \ || \ (COU \ \&\& \ !X1 \ \&\& \ shut))$
- **P3:** $A [] !(COU \ \&\& \ X11 \ \&\& \ stop)$

After the formal verification tasks, the obtained results are that all the properties are false.

5.3 Discussion of the Obtained Results

All the results, that are false in Formal Verification analysis, are related with the controller behaviour (Cyclic scan monitor of the PLC).

Indeed, in Simulation, this detail is not taken into account but, in Formal Verification (because it is an exhaustive technique!), these undesired behaviours are detected and we can show that, with this technique, the obtained results are exhaustive and precise.

Detailing the results obtained for the Property 1 we can interpret the obtained trace with the following sequence of human operator actions (see figure 2):

In the initial situation, of the system, if the human operator does not press the *start* button (as expected!) but presses the *stop* button, the step 12 is activated;

If, after that, the human operator presses the *shut* button the step 22 is activated too;

Further, if the human operator presses the *start* button the system does not start its normal behaviour because the variable step X21 is not activated and the step 1 remains active at least during a PLC internal cycle.

For all the other properties the obtained results (false) may be explained in the same way, when analyzing the respective traces.

To solve this problem, there are many possibilities. The simpler one seems to consider actuation priorities for the three buttons considered. These priorities must be included on the controller program specification and, consecutively, in the controller program implementation.

6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

With our study it has been possible to show that some problems can occur if the development of safe industrial controllers, for fully automated systems, are not developed taking into account some possible incorrect behaviours of human operators.

These possible undesired system behaviours can be detected, only, if it is used the Formal Verification technique; the Simulation technique is not sufficient.

The fully automated systems safety is almost totally linked to the technical reliability of the system and it must be guaranteed that some incorrect possible behaviours of the human operators do not compromise these systems' safety and dependability.

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